Entry into licensed professions requires meeting competency requirements, typically assessed through licensing examinations. In the market for lawyers, there are large di¤erences in the di¢ culty of the entry examination both across states and over time. The paper explores whether the number and quality of individuals attempting to enter the profession (potential supply) a¤ects the di¢ culty of the entry examination. The empirical results show that a larger potential supply leads to more di¢ cult licensing exams and lower pass rates. This implies that licensing partially shelters the legal market from supply shocks. JEL: L4, L5, J44, K2.
Introduction
For admission to most licensed professions, applicants must ful…ll the standards set by state licensing boards. This usually means passing a licensing examination and meeting a number of educational, residency and moral character and …tness requirements. According to Kleiner (2000) , over 800 occupations are licensed in at least one US state, including lawyers, accountants, auditors, teachers, nurses, engineers, psychologists, barbers and hairdressers. Occupational licensing directly a¤ects 18 percent of US workers, more than those a¤ected by either minimum wage or unionization. To enter a regulated profession, candidates have to meet the standards set by licensing boards.
To the extent that occupational licensing is replacing unions as the main labor market institution (Kreuger 2006) , an understanding of the determinants of licensing restrictions is becoming increasingly important. This paper explores the possibility of a link between potential supply and the stringency of entry requirements. While the existence of such a relationship is generally accepted in the literature (a summary is provided in Section 2), there is no direct evidence as to whether potential labor supply a¤ects entry requirements.
This may be, in part, due to the di¢ culty in measuring the stringency of entry requirements: while licensing boards may adjust the di¢ culty of the exams, their behavior is not generally observable to the researcher, nor are measures of candidate quality readily available.
By focusing on the US market for lawyers and studying the grading procedures of the bar exam in detail, these challenges can be overcome. I …nd that accurate data is, in fact, available on bar exam di¢ culty and outcomes. Moreover, detailed data concerning the ability and the number of candidates and describing the two key aspects (quality and quantity) of the potential labor supply can also be procured. Another factor making this market well suited for the present study is that the structure of the bar exam remains the same in the states and years in my sample, whereas the exam di¢ culty and the number and quality of candidates vary signi…cantly.
The empirical results of this paper reveal large discrepancies in exam di¢ culty across states. For example, when holding candidate ability constant, a change in exam di¢ culty from the standard in Alabama to the standard in California would imply a drop from 79% to 39% in the pass rate. 1 States with higher quality candidates or more numerous candidates tend to have more di¢ cult examinations. Also using within-state variability, I …nd a positive impact of the quality and number of candidates on the di¢ culty of the bar exam. Accounting for endogeneity signi…cantly reduces the impact of candidates' quality, but increases the estimated impact of the number of candidates. Overall, the paper shows that minimum entry requirements are relative standards, which respond to potential labor supply in the profession.
The magnitude of the impact of potential supply is considerable. Doubling the number of bar exam candidates implies an increase of about 8 percent in bar exam di¢ culty. This implies that the actual increase in lawyer supply is about half of the increase that would have happened without increases in standards. Thus, the bar exam partially shelters the legal market from supply shocks. More generally, it may dampen the impact of labor market policies targeted at increasing labor supply and may also a¤ect diversity in the profession. The results of this paper are relevant for the debate on the applicability of competition rules in professional markets, both in the US and in the European Union (Andrews 2002; Paterson, Fink and Ogus 2003; European Commission 2004) .
Related literature
The stringency of entry requirements is the key variable controlled by licensing boards.
The stated objective of entry examinations is uniquely to protect the public from unquali…ed practitioners. In fact, when standards are changed, there is typically no reference to changes in market conditions. However, there is agreement among economists that minimum standards are expected to vary depending on (potential) labor supply in the profession, since their impact on social welfare and salaries in the profession crucially depends on the availability of potential entrants. Independently of the exact objective function of licensing boards, then, potential supply is a key determinant of licensing stringency. 2 However, there is surprisingly little empirical research on the subject. In practice, 2 There are two main views of licensing. According to Adam Smith (1776, I.x.c.5) , the objective of licensing requirements "is to restrain the competition to a much smaller number than might otherwise be disposed to enter into the trade". According to this classic view, licensing is an institution that allows practitioners to capture monopoly rents by restricting entry (Friedman and Kuznets 1945, Stigler 1971) . More recent theoretical studies have focused on the existence of asymmetric information on the quality of professionals (Akerlof 1970 , Leland 1979 , Shaked and Sutton 1981 , Shapiro 1986 ). In the little is known on how and why entry requirements change.
In one of the early contributions to the literature on licensing, Maurizi (1974) …nds some cross-sectional evidence of a negative correlation between the number of applicants and the pass rate on professional exams. He suggests that this correlation may be evidence of licensing boards increasing exam di¢ culty in response to excess supply. Although this evidence is intriguing, using pass rates as a measure of licensing strictness has clear limitations, given that they depend both on exam di¢ culty and candidate ability. Le-er (1978) attempts to overcome this problem by developing a proxy for licensing di¢ culty in the market for physicians. Since candidates can take either a state or a national examination, the portion of candidates choosing the state exam is used to develop a proxy for state exam di¢ culty. Although this is a signi…cant step forward in measuring the stringency of entry requirements, the indirect procedure makes this proxy very imprecise. Moreover, candidate ability remains unobservable, and endogeneity may seriously a¤ect the analysis (p.182).
A related stream of literature has focused on the impact of licensing on wages and on the quality of professional services (Shepard 1978 , HaasWilson 1986 , Kleiner and Kudrle 2000 , Kugler and Sauer 2005 , Pagliero 2010 ), labor mobility (Pashigian 1979) , the origins of licensing (Law and Kim 2004) , and the impact on minorities (Law and Marks 2009 ). Harrington and Krynski (2002), and Harrington (2007) presence of asymmetric information, the licensing board takes into account both the quality-enhancing and competition-reducing e¤ects of entry requirements. In this setting, if the objectives of the licensing board correspond to social welfare, licensing may be socially bene…cial (the public interest theory of licensing, Leland 1979 Essay and case questions are set by state boards and graded at the state level, according to criteria set by each board. 5 In this case, a particular score does not necessarily correspond to a standard level of performance across states and years. However, most states have introduced essay score scaling. The most common scaling procedure is mean and variance scaling. Mean and variance scaling requires that each essay score be transformed so that the mean and variance of the distribution of scaled essay scores is equal to the mean and variance of the standardized test scores. The scaled essay scores are therefore not a¤ected by exam-speci…c unobserved di¤erences in exam di¢ culty or in the severity of grading procedures (Crocker and Algina 1986, Linn 1993) . 6 The overall scores (the weighted average of the standardized test and essay test score) thus share the same metric across states and years and can be compared. Since the pass-3 Exceptions are Delaware, Nevada and North Dakota, where the bar exam is held only once a year. 4 A more detailed description of the MBE can be found at http://www.ncbex.org. A similar standardized test is the Graduate Record Examination (GRE), often used in the admission process to graduate courses.
5 Some states have recently started to use essay and case questions developed by the National Conference of Bar Examiners (known as the Multistate Essay Examination and Multistate Professional Test). When this is the case, the Conference provides state boards with possible exam questions and some analysis of the issues involved in each question in order to facilitate grading. Even when using this service, state boards grade the answers independently, using standards set locally. 6 An alternative scaling procedure is quantile by quantile equating. The results of the two techniques are not necessarily the same but di¤erences are empirically small (see Lenel 1992). fail decision is based on overall scores, the observed minimum quality standards for each state share a common metric and provide a simple measure of exam di¢ culty. (In the rest of the paper, I will refer to the overall minimum quality standard as exam di¢ culty, or the minimum standard). 7 Data on minimum standards is available from either 1984 or from the introduction of comparable standards (reported in Table 1 , column 1), whichever is later, to 2009. 8 Table 1 , column 2 reports any changes in minimum quality standards, while Column 3 reports the corresponding date of each change. Column 4 reports the minimum quality standard in the last year of the sample. Table 1 Table 2 ). Figure 1 shows that states with better candidates tend to have more di¢ cult examinations. States with more candidates also appear to have slightly more di¢ cult examinations ( Figure 2 ). 9 California, for example, 7 The weights given to the two exam components may vary across states. Empirically, the weight given to the standardized test varies between 50 percent and 65 percent. For realistic distribution of scores and standards, however, these di¤erences do not a¤ect the comparability of minimum standards. 8 The main source of standard and grading procedure data is The Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements, published annually by the American Bar Association and the National Conference of Bar Examiners. This source is complemented by information from various issues of The Bar Examiner, published by the National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBEX). When standards are comparable, but not expressed on a 0-200 point basis, the standards have been converted to a 0-200 basis to increase the consistency of Table 1. In the Comprehensive Guide there is some uncertainty as to when some standards changed. Wherever possible, additional sources have been used to pinpoint the exact date of change. In the few cases where no such data was available, the earliest date compatible with the information in the Comprehensive Guide was used.
9 While the correlation coe¢ cient between the two variables in Figure 1 is positive and statistically has relatively di¢ cult examinations and a large number of relatively good candidates.
Alabama, on the other hand, has a small number of relatively weak candidates.
Data limitations
Data availability has been a long-standing issue in the literature on licensing. 10 though they follow the grading procedures described above, some states do not publish their minimum standards.
The second limit to the data set concerns the availability of mean MBE score data (measuring bar exam candidates'quality), since only 12 licensing boards chose to provide this information. This problem is mitigated by using data on pass rates and exam di¢ culty to infer the mean MBE score for additional states and years. Appendix 1 describes in detail the construction of the data set. The third limitation of the data set is that exam di¢ culty is not frequently changed within a given state (see Table 1 ), as changes in admission rules typically involve a time-consuming bureaucratic process. This limits the inferences one can make about state speci…c responses to changes in potential labor supply.
signi…cant, for Figure 2 it is positive but not statistically signi…cant. 1 0 Kleiner (2006, p.199) notes that "...perhaps the largest barrier standing in the way of analysis of occupational licensing is that there is no well-organized national data set waiting to be exploited. (...) Moreover, state licensing boards often are reluctant to provide (...) information to the researchers".
Empirical results
I estimate regressions of the general form
where D i;t is the exam di¢ culty in state i and year t; q i;t is the average quality of candidates, as measured by the average MBE score; N i;t is the log of the number of candidates;
t and i are state and year …xed e¤ects, and u i;t is the idiosyncratic error term. Since changes in minimum standards are determined in advance, my empirical speci…cation (1) allows for a lagged impact of potential supply on exam di¢ culty. Summary statistics are provided in Table 2 .
Cross Sectional Evidence Table A1 , column 1).
candidates preparing for a di¢ cult exam may study more than those taking an easier examination. Reverse causality may thus further bias upwards the impact of candidate quality. Third, there may be some omitted state characteristics that independently lead to high entry standards and high potential supply. 12
Within State Evidence
With these considerations in mind, I next focus on states that changed their entry standards in the sample period, so that state-speci…c unobserved characteristics can be accounted for by using state …xed e¤ects. This implies a substantial reduction in sample size (from 37 to 11 states), but also a reduction in unobserved heterogeneity. To ensure that the reduction in sample size does signi…cantly a¤ect the results, Table 3 , columns 3-4 reproduce the results in columns 1-2 using the reduced sample. The impact of the number and quality of bar exam candidates is still positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, and the magnitude of the e¤ects is even larger than before. Table 3 , column 5 reports the results controlling for state-speci…c …xed e¤ects. The impact of the number and quality of bar exam candidates is still positive. The magnitude of the coe¢ cients is quite di¤erent from that obtained using cross sectional variability.
The impact of quality is about half of that obtained in columns 3-4, while the impact of the number of candidates is 60 percent higher. These changes are consistent with a signi…cant self-selection of candidates across states, and/or exam di¢ culty a¤ecting candidates'e¤ort in exam preparation, and/or unobserved state characteristics a¤ecting both potential supply and exam di¢ culty.
The state …xed e¤ects account for signi…cant sources of potential bias in the estimates, but endogeneity may still be a problem when using within state variability: increases over time in exam di¢ culty may in fact result in worse candidates taking the exam in a di¤erent state, moving to a di¤erent profession, or studying harder for the exam. All of these would imply an upward bias in the coe¢ cient of quality, and a downward bias in the coe¢ cient of the number of candidates. The issue can be addressed using instrumental variables; these must be correlated with potential supply but not with the error term in (1).
Instrumental Variables
Bar exam candidates typically need to have a law school degree, which usually requires at least three years of law school. Within any given state, then, the quality of students admitted to law school three years before a given bar exam is likely to be correlated with the quality of bar exam candidates (after controlling for state …xed e¤ects), since many students take the bar exam in the state where they studied. A similar argument can be made for the number of …rst-year law school students, which is likely to be correlated with the number of bar exam candidates three years later (after controlling for state …xed e¤ects). Information on LSAT scores of admitted students provides a good measure of the candidates'average quality (the LSAT is a standardized examination used by law schools to screen applicants). Detailed information on class size for each law school in each year is also available from the American Bar Association. The magnitude and statistical signi…cance of these correlations can be estimated; hence the empirical relevance of the instruments can be tested.
The quality of admitted students and their class size is unlikely to be a¤ected by exam di¢ culty three years later (after controlling for state …xed e¤ects). This is an assumption that needs to be maintained, but can be reasonably justi…ed. First, the …rst three cohorts of students taking the bar exam after a change in standards could not possibly have known about such a change when they enrolled in law school. Hence, reverse causality and selection at the time of entry into law school can be completely ruled out. Second, even for later cohorts, it is unlikely that changes in bar exam di¢ culty of the magnitude observed in the data could be a signi…cant factor in determining law school choice. Compared to di¤erences across schools in ranking, quality, and selectivity, observed di¤erences in bar exam di¢ culty within a state seem unlikely to determine law school choice. Moreover, law school graduates can choose to take the bar exam in a state di¤erent from where they studied. Thus, it is not clear why an increase in bar exam di¢ culty would deter students from attending their school of choice (among those who have admitted them). 13 1 3 The application and admission process is complex and noisy. Law schools are very selective: about These considerations suggest that the quality and number of …rst-year law school students (lagged three years) can be reasonably excluded from the equation (1). Table 3 , column 6 reports the 2SLS estimates of the impact of potential supply on exam di¢ culty. Table 4 , columns 1-2 report the …rst stage estimates. As expected, column 1 shows that the number of matriculated students is positively correlated with the number of bar exam candidates three years later. Similarly, column 2 shows that the quality of law school students (LSAT score) is positively correlated with the quality of bar exam candidates three years later (MBE score). These estimated e¤ects are statistically di¤erent from zero at a one percent con…dence level. The partial R 2 of the …rst stage regressions show that the instruments account for a signi…cant portion of the variability of the two endogenous regressors, 13 and 38 percent respectively. The F-tests of the excluded instruments in the …rst stage are large, and the null of weak instruments can be rejected using the thresholds of Stock and Jogo (2002). 14 The 2SLS estimates in Table 3 , column 6 show that the impact of the number of bar exam candidates on exam di¢ culty is again positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at conventional levels. Its magnitude is larger than in column 5. Consider the impact of doubling the number of candidates (by drawing from a given score distribution): with no change in exam di¢ culty, this would lead to an average increase in the number of successful candidates of about 73 percent (which is the average pass rate). In practice, however, the exam di¢ culty will grow in response to the increased potential supply by 11 on the MBE scale, which implies that the number of successful candidates will grow by just 36 percent. Hence, about half of the e¤ect on the number of entrants in the profession is o¤set by the increase in exam di¢ culty. 15 The increase in the magnitude of the impact of the number of candidates is consistent with some remaining endogeneity in the within half of law school applicants do not receive any admission. Even those who make it into law school do not have the chance of choosing among a large number of alternatives. On average, students entering law schools received just 2.8 admissions. Detailed information on the law school admission process is reported in Courty and Pagliero (2010) .
1 4 The weak instrument problem is generally more relevant in overidenti…ed than in just identi…ed models. 1 5 These …gures are obtained for an hypothetical state with mean exam di¢ culty (134) and Gaussian score distribution with mean equal to the mean MBE score (141) and standard deviation equal to 12 (see Appendix 2). state regression (column 5). In fact, selection e¤ects may lead to a negative correlation between exam di¢ culty and the number of bar exam candidates thus biasing downward the impact of the number of candidates in OLS regressions.
The 2SLS estimate of the impact of candidates' quality is smaller than in column 5
and not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. This also supports the idea that within state results were a¤ected by some remaining endogeneity. The IV estimate is also far less precise than the corresponding OLS estimate (the standard error is almost double than in column 5) and the 95 percent con…dence interval of the 2SLS estimate is [ 0:56; 0:10]:
Hence, on the one hand, the null of no impact of candidates'quality cannot be rejected.
On the other, the power of the test is rather small, and the 95 percent con…dence interval still includes values which imply a signi…cant impact of candidate quality on the number of entrants in the profession. 16 
Robustness Results
Although examinations are by far the most common admission procedure, admission to the bar is sometimes possible without taking the bar exam. Lawyers licensed in other states may be admitted on motion, typically on the basis of reciprocity agreements. 17 In principle, the number of these admissions may a¤ect lawyer supply and may therefore impact exam di¢ culty. When I include the number of admissions on motion in my speci…cation, the results are not substantially a¤ected (Table A) . The number of lawyers admitted on motion has a positive impact on exam di¢ culty. Although the magnitude of such an e¤ect is small, this …nding reinforces the conclusion that bar exam di¢ culty is a¤ected by the supply side of the market for lawyers.
In addition to the bar exam, admission to the legal profession also requires passing the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE). The MPRE is a standardized multiple-choice examination based on law governing the conduct of lawyers, including 1 6 For example, 0.1 still implies that about 12 percent of the e¤ect of increases in candidate quality on the number of entrants in the profession is o¤set by increases in exam di¢ culty.
1 7 In 2004, there were fewer than 6,000 admissions on motion, but over 49,000 by examination (NCBEX). Only in the District of Columbia is this the main mode of admission to the bar. However, the results are not a¤ected when I exclude the corresponding observations from the sample. Direct admission of law school graduates (by diploma privilege) is signi…cant only in Wisconsin, which has been excluded from the sample. the disciplinary rules and principles of professional conduct. Data on the minimum scores required for passing this exam is available for each state. 18 If higher minimum MPRE score were used by licensing boards as a substitute for a more di¢ cult bar exam, one would expect that states with higher MPRE thresholds would have an easier bar exam, all other variables being held constant. However, there are virtually no changes in MPRE minimum scores, so the results in Table 3 , column 5 and 6 cannot be a¤ected. 19 Admission to the bar also depends on meeting educational standards and moral character and …tness requirements. Although educational standards impose signi…cant costs to candidates, they do not vary signi…cantly across states, and are …xed for a given state. 20 The procedures for moral character and …tness evaluation cannot easily be compared across states and years, but there is no evidence of signi…cant within state variability. 21 Moreover, the existing evidence suggests that these procedures directly a¤ect only a very small number of candidates.
Conclusions
Occupational licensing is one of the most important labor market institutions today, yet the actual behavior of licensing boards is rarely examined because of a lack of data and the complexity of licensing requirements. This paper is the …rst attempt to study the impact of potential supply on the di¢ culty of the entry examination. The main …nding is that supply considerations are important for explaining licensing requirements. In particular, increases in the number of potential entrants lead to more stringent entry requirements, even after controlling for the average quality of candidates. 1 8 The MPRE is required for admission to the bar in all but three US jurisdictions. Data on the number of MPRE candidates and their performance is not available. As opposed to the bar exam, most candidates take the MPRE during their second or third year of law school, well before applying for the bar exam. Overall, the complexity of the subjects tested on the MPRE is much lower than on the bar exam. The breadth of the subject also suggests that much less e¤ort is usually required to pass (this is consistent with the lower emphasis given by review courses to MPRE preparation).
1 9 When we exclude the one state, Missouri, in which a change in MPRE standard occurred in the sample period, there is no change in the results.
2 0 Overall, most bar exam candidates hold a law school degree. In 2004, for example, only two states had more than 10 percent of total candidates without a US law school degree. The existence of a relationship between potential supply and entry requirements has a number of potentially important implications. Professional markets may be sheltered from the impact of policies increasing potential supply. For example, a policy increasing the availability of legal education, while holding quality constant, may increase the number of candidates but only partially increase the supply of lawyers. A second implication is that licensing may a¤ect how groups with di¤erent average ability are represented within a profession. Consider an increase in the number of bar exam candidates (as the outcome of a policy subsidizing legal education, for example) which equally a¤ects all groups of candidates. As standards increase, groups with lower average performance become less represented among the successful candidates. 22 Even if a similar policy only increases the number of candidates from a group with relatively low average bar exam performance, a decrease in the fraction of successful candidates from such group cannot be ruled out.
At a more general level, this paper shows that entry requirements respond to market forces and, hence, are not uniquely based on some abstract notion of consumer protection, unrelated to market conditions. This should not be interpreted as evidence in favor or against any speci…c theory of occupational licensing. 23 The focus of this paper is to study one speci…c determinant of entry requirements, and the implications for policy issues. From this point of view, it is worth considering the possibility of certi…cation, as an alternative to licensing (Kleiner 2006) . Certi…cation permits any person to practice the profession, but a public or private institution certi…es those who have achieved a given level of competence. Certi…cation may increase the e¤ectiveness of policies a¤ecting potential labor supply, while still revealing information on practitioners'quality.
Appendix 1. Data construction and sources

MBE mean scores
The lack of complete information on MBE mean scores is the main limitation of the data set. However, one can infer MBE scores using information on pass rates and exam di¢ culty. The procedure is based on the realistic assumption that the shape of the score distribution is stable over time. More speci…cally, I assume that the state speci…c score distribution is Gaussian, with a constant standard deviation. 24 Consider, for example, the exam outcomes in subsequent years for a given state, with a given constant exam di¢ culty. If the standard deviation of the distribution does not change over time, then changes in pass rate from one year to the next will re ‡ect changes in the location of the score distribution. Since there is a one to one relation between pass rate and the mean of the score distribution, changes in pass rate can then be used to infer changes in mean MBE scores (details provided below).
There are advantages and disadvantages to taking this approach. The main advantage is that I can partly compensate for the di¢ culty in obtaining information from licensing boards. Second, I can e¢ ciently use the information on the number of successful and unsuccessful candidates, which is very precise, complete and publicly available. Hence, I can increase the number of observations and signi…cantly improve the quality of the inference. 25 The main drawback of this approach is that some assumptions about the score distribution are necessary. However, I test the robustness of the results using alternative assumptions and the results are not a¤ected. Moreover, the proposed method seems reasonably accurate in capturing mean MBE scores variability, independently of the speci…c functional form assumptions. Overall, the advantages from e¢ ciently using the available information on pass rates seem to outweigh the disadvantages from maintaining some 2 4 Although there is no direct evidence at the state level, the available information at the US level suggest that the overall shape of the score distribution is stable over time. Moreover, the standard deviation of the score distribution does not show any signi…cant trend, suggesting that the assumption of constant standard deviation is realistic.
2 5 The results are consistent with what I would obtain using the original data, but they are much more precise.
assumptions on the score distribution.
The procedure for recovering MBE mean scores is the following:
1. Consider how exam-speci…c results (that is, two separate exams for each state and year) are generated. Each candidate passes the bar exam if his/her overall score is above a given threshold. In exam k, in state i, candidates'scores are independent draws from a normal distribution with mean i;k (equal to the mean MBE score for exam k) and unknown variance 2 i . Hence, the number of candidates passing the bar exam is de…ned, for each examination, by
where F (:) is the cumulative distribution function of the standardized normal distribution. The likelihood of observing P k successful candidates out of N k exam candidates is then
where D i;k is the observed exam di¢ culty. Using information for the 12 states for which I can observe D i;k ; i;k ; N i;k ; and P i;k ; maximization of the log-likelihood ln L provides estimates of i : 26 2. Having estimates of the standard deviation of the score distribution, one can recover the mean score even when it is not made available by licensing boards. Given how the pass rate is determined, and the fact that we exactly observe D i;k ; P i;k ; and N i;k , q i;t can be computed inverting the identity (2),
where b i is the estimated standard deviation of the score distribution in state i (or the mean = and 1992 are interpolated, the number of observations can be increased up to the level of the OLS regressions in Table 3 (columns 3-5). The results are not signi…cantly a¤ected (see Table A1 , column 5). This suggests that the shorter time series used for the 2SLS results in Table 3 are not driving the results. In columns 3-6, states with no change in bar exam difficulty are excluded from the regression (see Table 1 ). In column 6, the 2SLS estimates are obtained using as IVs the number of matriculated students and the mean LSAT score for students accepted into law schools in the same state in t-4. The number of observations is smaller than in columns 3-5 because of limited availability of data on the instrumental variables (see Appendix 1 for details on data availability). The first stage regression results are reported in Table 4 . *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Note: Column one reports the cross sectional correlation between potential supply and exam difficulty, as in Table 3 , column 2, but the number of candidates is divided by the population in the state. Column 5 reports 2SLS estimates, as in Table 3 , column 6. The number of observations is now larger (231) than in Table 3 , column 6 because observations from 1989 to 2009 are used (see Appendix 1 for details). Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10% level.
